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CAN mIV-NEGATIVE PLAINTIFFS RECOVER EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR THEIR FEAR OF AIDS?
JAMES C MAROULIS
INTRODUCTION
A hospital patient who has tested positive for HIV'-the virus that
causes AIDS2-- goes berserk and bites himself.3 With the infected blood
on his teeth, he later bites the police officer sent to subdue him.'
Although the officer repeatedly tests negative for the AIDS virus5 over
several years, he recovers damages for his fear of AIDS.6
A woman visiting a sick relative in a hospital is stuck by needles in a
contaminated needle receptacle.7 She sues for damages, including fear of
AIDS.8 She tests HIV negative and presents no evidence of exposure to
HIV.9 The trial court grants the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, but the appellate court determines that a jury should decide
whether her fear is reasonable."0
A husband tells his wife that he has AIDS and asks her to move away
so that she will not have to watch him die.II In fact, he is HIV negative
and is telling a deliberate lie.12 Upon discovering this deceit, the wife
brings suit to recover emotional distress damages for her fear of AIDS,
even though she is certain that she is HIV negative. 3 The court denies
the husband's motion to dismiss and holds that the wife has stated a valid
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress."
As these cases indicate, HIV-negative plaintiffs are attempting to re-
cover emotional distress damages for their fear that they will develop
AIDS in the future. These cases create a tension between the public's
fear of this deadly disease and traditional tort law policies limiting recov-
ery for emotional distress damages.' 5 Because of HIV's unique attrib-
I. This Note uses the term "HIV" to refer to human immunodeficiency virus.
2. This Note uses the term "AIDS" to refer to acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome.
3. See Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 890 (W. Va.
1991).
4. See id
5. This Note uses the term "the AIDS virus" to refer to human immunodeficiency
virus.
6. See Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 891-92.
7. See Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
8. See id at *2.
9. See id
10. See id. at *5.
11. See Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251, 252 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 253.
15. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
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utes, it is difficult to assess the validity of an HIV-negative plaintiff's
fear-of-AIDS claim.
AIDS is unusual in several respects. First, there is no cure for AIDS,
and the mortality rate is very high.16 Second, the number of AIDS cases
is increasing rapidly, and AIDS is reaching epidemic proportions. 7 At
least 1.5 million people in the United States and five million people
worldwide are infected with HIV.18 Third, AIDS is unusual because of
its long dormancy period. For approximately three months following ex-
posure, no test can determine whether a person is HIV positive."' After
this period, reliable tests can determine whether or not a person is in-
fected.20 An infected person who has not taken an AIDS test, however,
is unlikely to know that he2 is HIV positive. Many people show no
AIDS symptoms until ten years after initial infection.22 In fact, most
HIV carriers are unaware that they have the virus. 23 Fourth, HIV is an
unusual virus because it can only be transmitted by bodily fluids such as
blood or semen.24
Fear-of-AIDS claims are complicated by people's perception of AIDS.
The public views AIDS with much fear and some panic. 25 This fear is
16. See Andrew N. Phillips et. al., Immunodeficiency and the Risk of Death in HIV
Infection, 268 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 2662, 2664-65 (1992) (discussing mortality rate from
AIDS).
17. See Gerald Friedland et. al., Additional Evidence for Lack of Transmission of HIV
Infection by Close Interpersonal (Casual) Contact, 4 AIDS 639, 640 (1990).
18. See id. at 642.
19. See Interpretation and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infections, 38 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 5
(July 21, 1989) ("[S]eroconversion typically occurs within 3 months of infection."); Pub-
lic Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infec-
tion andAIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 509 (Aug. 14, 1987) ("Persons
exposed to HIV usually develop detectable levels of antibody against the virus within 6-
12 weeks of infection.").
20. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 509-10 (Aug.
14, 1987) (stating that persons "exposed to HIV usually develop detectable levels of an-
tibody against the virus within 6-12 weeks of infection," and stating that AIDS tests are
99% accurate).
21. Singular and masculine words are used for practical purposes only and shall be
deemed to include the plural and feminine, respectively, unless the context plainly indi-
cates a distinction.
22. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 509 ("Many
infected persons may have minimal or no clinical evidence of disease for years.").
23. See id.
24. See Alan R. Lifson, Do Alternate Modes for Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Exist?, 259 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1353, 1353-56 (1988).
25. See AIDS Virus Found To Survive in Dentist's Tools, L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1992,
at A20 (discussing "widespread fear about catching AIDS from dental procedures");
Mireya Navarro, Fear of AIDS Is Higher in New York, Poll Finds, N.Y. Times, June 26,
1991, at B3 (noting that a poll found that 43% of New Yorkers were "very concerned"
about getting AIDS); Michael R. Kagay, Poll Finds AIDS Causes Single People To Alter
Behavior, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1991, at C3 (discussing how people have changed their
sexual behavior because they fear AIDS).
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augmented by the fact that many people are ignorant about how HIV is
transmitted.26 Although most people know that they can contract HIV
via sexual intercourse or sharing a hypodermic needle with an infected
person," many people mistakenly believe that they can contract the
AIDS virus via casual contact. One survey found that 60% of people
believed that HIV could be transmitted by using a public toilet,2" and
73% feared that they would be infected if they shared eating utensils
with an ILV-positive person.29 Additionally, 47% believed that HIV
could be transmitted by working with an infected person." Misunder-
standings about how the AIDS virus is transmitted have caused people to
act based on unreasonable fears: people have refused to work with HIV-
positive co-workers; 31 workers have been fired because they are HIV pos-
itive;32 professional athletes have voiced concerns about playing against
an HIV-positive opponent;33 high school football teams have refused to
compete against a school from a town with a high incidence of HIV
infection.34
Given the misunderstanding about how HIV is transmitted, it is not
surprising that people who were never put at risk of contracting BIlV
have brought suit alleging fear of infection. 3- For example, a prisoner
brought suit to recover for his fear of AIDS based on the fact that he
shared "a drinking fountain, toilet, towels, shower stall, bath tub, and
phone booth" with two HIV-positive patients. 36 The court found that
the prisoner's fear was unfounded and granted the defendant's motion
26. See Gerald Friedland et al., Additional Evidence for Lack of Transmission of HI V
Infection by Close Interpersonal (Casual) Contact, 4 AIDS 639, 642 (1990).
27. See iL at 642 (citing a survey that found that 69-91% of adults were knowledgea-




31. See Stuart Silverstein, AIDS and the Workplace, L.A. Times, Nov. 7, 1992, at DI
(seventeen of a store's 25 employees threatened to quit if an HIV-positive salesman, who
had taken sick leave, came back to work).
32. See Barnaby J. Feder, Unorthodox Behemoth of Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1993, § 3, at 1, 6 (in a case in which a large law firm fired a lawyer because he had AIDS,
the firm lost the ensuing suit and was required to pay S1 million to the lawyer's estate).
33. See William Gildea, With the Pleasure, a Strong Dose of Pain, Wash. Post, Dec.
31, 1992, at Dl (professional basketball star Magic Johnson retired from the sport be-
cause other players expressed concerns that they would be exposed to possible infection if
they played against him).
34. See Mike Clary, Small Town Offers a Disturbing Look at Future of the AIDS War,
L.A. Times, Jan. 28, 1993, at A5.
35. See, eg., Seddens v. McGinnis, 972 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1992) (text available in
Westlaw, at *3) (granting a motion to dismiss a claim by a prisoner claiming that the
prison exposed him to the risk of HIV transmission by not separating AIDS-infected
prisoners from the prison population, and stating that the "plaintiff's fears regarding the
risks associated with being housed near AIDS-infected inmates are unrecognized by the
mainstream medical community, and reflect ignorance of the means by which AIDS can
be transmitted").





This Note examines the elements necessary to prove a cause of action
for damages for fear of AIDS. This Note analyzes claims for emotional
distress damages made by plaintiffs who have tested HIV negative.3"
Part I considers recovery for fear of AIDS as a damage resulting from a
defendant's negligence or intentional tort. This part begins by analyzing
the duty of care in fear-of-disease cases. Next, this part discusses proxi-
mate cause and focuses on two issues: first, whether a plaintiff claiming
damages for fear of AIDS is required to provide evidence demonstrating
actual exposure to HIV; second, whether a plaintiff can recover damages
for his continuing fear of AIDS after taking a reliable test that indicates
that he is HIV negative. Part II discusses and criticizes the reasoning of
some decisions in fear-of-AIDS cases. Part III proposes two methods for
limiting liability while allowing recovery for reasonable fear. This Note
concludes that courts should limit plaintiffs' ability to recover damages
for fear of AIDS.
I. TORT LAW UNDERLYING FEAR OF AIDS CLAIMS
Most plaintiffs who claim damages for fear of AIDS bring suit in
tort."9 This section examines the causes of action that can be the basis
for a fear-of-AIDS claim. This section discusses negligence actions first,
followed by battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A. Negligence: Duty and Breach
When a plaintiff brings a negligence action claiming damages for fear
of AIDS, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant breached a
duty of care owed to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff must also show that the
37. See id. at *2.
38. This Note does not address the issue of recovery for fear of AIDS by HIV-positive
plaintiffs. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see John Patrick Darby, Note, Tort
Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospec-
tive AIDS, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185 (1988). Many of the elements necessary for
recovery are identical for HIV-negative and HIV-positive plaintiffs. One area, however,
where claims by HIV-negative and HIV-positive plaintiffs substantially diverge is in the
overall reasonableness of the claims. Because it is almost certain that an HIV-positive
plaintiff will develop AIDS, the plaintiff's fear is clearly reasonable. It is unclear, how-
ever, whether an HIV-negative plaintiff's fear is reasonable.
39. See, e.g., Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc., No. 92-4139, 1992 WL 232765
(5th Cir. Oct. 8, 1992) (products liability); Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178,
1991 WL 240460 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1991) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) ("negligence, gross negli-
gence, conspicuous indifference, recklessness and/or willful and wanton conduct, battery,
and negligent, intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress"); Johnson v.
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (V. Va. 1991) (negligence).
40. See W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 164
(5th ed. 1984) (noting that duty and breach are essential elements of a negligence cause of
action).
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defendant's breach proximately caused the plaintiff's fear of AIDS.4
Before examining whether people have a duty not to make other peo-
ple fear contracting a disease, it is helpful to examine whether people
have a duty not to infect others with diseases. Plaintiffs can almost cer-
tainly bring a cause of action for negligent transmission of AIDS be-
cause, historically, courts have allowed recovery for negligent
transmission of other diseases.42 Commonly, these cases involved vene-
real diseases.4" Recently, courts have begun to recognize that a plaintiff
can pursue a cause of action for negligent transmission of AIDS." At
least one court has noted that liability for transmission of AIDS can be
based on the same theory as transmission of a venereal disease.4" Fur-
ther, other courts probably will treat AIDS as a venereal disease (for
purposes of negligence actions) because some courts have recognized
41. See id at 165.
42. See Crim v. International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
landowner liable for damages sustained when, due to landowner's negligence, invitee con-
tracted valley fever); Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (allowing recovery
for negligently exposing people to whooping cough); Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
500 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (allowing recovery when a plaintiff contracted salmo-
nella due to hospital's negligence); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (holding that a cause of action existed when a physician allegedly negligently
failed to diagnose the infant plaintiff's father as infected with tuberculosis and infant
plaintiff allegedly was exposed to and contracted tuberculosis as a result), cert. denied,
245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 23 N.W. 632 (Iowa 1885) (allowing
recovery for exposure to smallpox after defendants hotel-owners misrepresented that
there was not an outbreak of smallpox at their hotel); Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477
(1873) (liability for exposure to smallpox); Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1910) (recognizing a cause of action for negligently exposing persons to smallpox);
Edwards v. Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (negligent transmission of infection from a
wound); Earle v. Kulko, 98 A.2d 107 (N.J. Super. 1953) (recognizing that negligent
transmission of tuberculosis constitutes a cause of action); Kliegel v. Aitken, 69 N.W. 67
(Wis. 1896) (recognizing cause of action for negligent transmission of typhoid).
43. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989) (recognizing a negligence
cause of action for transmitting herpes); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming a lower court's award of damages when a man negligently transmitted
herpes to his girlfriend); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (recognizing that a cause of action can be maintained under theories of battery or
negligence for transmitting herpes); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(recognizing a cause of action for negligent transmission of herpes); B.N. v. K.K., 538
A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988) (same); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(same); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (stating that the doctrine of
spousal immunity does not bar a cause of action for negligence when husband allegedly
transmitted herpes to his wife); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206 (N.C. 1920) (husband
liable for negligently exposing wife to venereal disease); Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d
14 (fex. 1987) (court upholds claim of negligence when husband transmitted a venereal
disease to his wife); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo.) (recognizing that negligent
transmission of gonorrhea may be actionable but reversing award of damages because
statute of limitations had expired), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
44. See United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); Smith
v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991).
45. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
("If a person knowingly has genital herpes, AIDS or some other contagious and serious
disease, a limited representation that he or she does not have a venereal disease is no
defense to this type of action.").
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causes of action for negligently infecting a plaintiff with a sexually trans-
mittable disease not identified as a "venereal disease" by the state
legislature.46
As in other negligence actions, the duty in transmission of disease
cases is one of due care under the circumstances. Generally, a person has
a duty not to expose others to a disease.47 In cases involving venereal
diseases, this duty requires a person who is or should be aware of the
infection either to tell his partner about the condition or to abstain from
having sex.4" One court, however, declined to articulate any duty for
persons infected with a venereal disease other than reasonable care under
the circumstances.49 Another court extended the duty of care not only to
the sexual partner but also to the partner's husband.50 That court rea-
soned that it was foreseeable that the defendant's sexual partner subse-
quently would have sex with her husband.5"
Although the duty to act with due care requires people to take steps to
prevent infecting others with diseases, including AIDS, it is far more dif-
ficult to determine under what circumstances people have a duty to pro-
tect others against the fear of developing a disease. Before a plaintiff can
recover for fear of AIDS, he must demonstrate that a defendant had a
duty not to cause the plaintiff to fear developing the disease, and that the
46. See, eg., Kathleen K, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276 n.3 (noting that a cause of action will
not be barred even though herpes is not listed as a venereal disease in the California
health code); Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that
herpes can be considered a venereal disease even though it is not listed as such in the
Georgia health code).
47. See Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) ("It is
recognized that once a contagious disease is known to exist a duty arises on the part of
the physician to use reasonable care to advise and warn members of the patient's immedi-
ate family of the existence and dangers of the disease."), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla.
1971); Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (noting that a
person with smallpox has a duty either "to so conduct himself as not to communicate this
disease" or a "duty to keep away from other persons, or should other persons approach
him, to notify them of the fact so that they might protect themselves"); Edwards v.
Lamb, 45 A. 480 (N.H. 1899) (defendant doctor failed to exercise due care in exposing
plaintiff to infectious wound and plaintiff later developed infection).
48. See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) ("We hold that one
who knows, or should know, that he or she is infected with genital herpes is under a duty
to either abstain from sexual contact with others or, at least, to warn others of the infec-
tion prior to having contact with them."); Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107
(App. Div. 1986) (husband had affirmative duty to inform wife that he was infected with
a venereal disease); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989) ("A person
who knows, or should know that he or she is infected with a venereal disease has the duty
to abstain from sexual conduct or, at a minimum, to warn those persons with whom he or
she expects to have sexual relations of his or her condition."). Cf C.A.U. v. R.L., 438
N.W.2d 441, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("Respondent had no duty as a matter of law to
warn appellant that he had the disease AIDS when at the time of their sexual relationship
it was not reasonably foreseeable that he had the disease and could cause appellant
harm.").
49. See Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).




defendant breached this duty. It is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege
that the defendant breached some duty of care not to expose the plaintiff
to AIDS; the plaintiff must demonstrate that this duty extended to pro-
tecting the plaintiff from emotional distress caused by his fear of infec-
tion. Addressing this issue requires examining both the law regarding
emotional distress damages and how this law applies to fear of AIDS,
given HIV's unusual characteristics.
1. Limitations on Emotional Distress Damages
For several reasons, courts traditionally have been reluctant to find
that a defendant had a duty to prevent a plaintiff from suffering emo-
tional distress. First, there is the problem of providing compensation for
"harm that is often temporary and relatively trivial."' -2 Second, there is a
"danger that claims of mental harm will be falsified or imagined." 53
Third, in negligence cases, there is the "perceived unfairness of imposing
heavy and disproportionate financial burdens upon a defendant, whose
conduct was only negligent, for consequences that appear remote from
the 'wrongful' act."54 Fourth, establishing proximate cause is often a
problem, because the plaintiff's emotional injuries are remote from the
physical consequences of the defendant's actions." Fifth, there is the
concern "that mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of
money."56 Finally, allowing people to sue for emotional distress could
produce a flood of litigation.5
To address these concerns, courts have placed restrictions on plaintiffs
who seek to recover for emotional distress. Historically, some courts
have required a plaintiff to suffer some physical injury before holding a
defendant liable for mental damages.5" Although this continues to be an
52. Keeton, supra note 40, at 361.
53. Id
54. Id ; Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis. 1974) ("In
this case, although there is no question about there being in fact a fear of future cancer,
the claim of damages (by way of cancer) is so remote and is so out of proportion to the
culpability of the tort-feasor.").
55. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361; Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217
N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis. 1974) ("[E]ven though the fear or phobia exists in fact, the de-
fendants are not held accountable where, as here, public policy compels this court, be-
cause of the remoteness of this element of damage, to excuse defendants from liability.").
56. Keeton, supra note 40, at 360.
57. See id
58. See id at 363 ("With a cause of action established by the physical harm, 'para-
sitic' damages are awarded, and it is considered that there is sufficient assurance that the
mental injury is not feigned."). See also Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377,
380 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that both New Jersey and Pennsylvania law require a plaintiff
to sustain some physical injury before emotional distress damages can be recovered); Ad-
ams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Adams' reliance
on these cases is misplaced. Each affirms an award for mental anguish caused by a physi-
cal injury proven to exist. The jury in this case concluded that Adams did not sustain an
injury."); Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 274 (3d Cir. 1985) (no re-
covery for fear of cancer when plaintiffs sustained no physical injury); Poole v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1988) ("Illinois courts have con-
19931
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important consideration in many jurisdictions,59 injury is no longer re-
quired in every case.' ° Similarly, courts traditionally have required that
the plaintiff sustain some form of physical impact (as contrasted with
injury) as a result of the defendant's negligence before the plaintiff can
recover mental damages. 6' Today, however, many jurisdictions have
abandoned the strict impact requirement.62 In fact, several courts have
adopted a new approach that allows a plaintiff to recover emotional dam-
ages if the defendant's tortious conduct causes the death or serious injury
of a close member of the plaintiff's family and if the plaintiff was in the
zone of danger and was exposed to the possibility of similar injury.63
Finally, some courts have adopted an approach that allows a plaintiff
who has not suffered either injury or impact to recover for emotional
distress if the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff and,
as a result, the plaintiff suffered emotional distress.6
2. The Physical Injury Requirement
In cases involving fear of future illness, courts have applied the tradi-
tional common law requirement that a plaintiff suffer some physical in-
jury before the defendant will become liable for emotional distress. 65
sistently refused to allow recovery for mental or emotional distress in the absence of a
physical injury or illness, and the complaint alleges none."); DeStories v. City of Phoenix,
744 P.2d 705, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (person can recover emotional distress damages
"when it is shown that there is a physical invasion of [the] person or the person's
security").
59. See supra note 58.
60. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (en
banc) ("We agree that the unqualified requirement of physical injury is no longer justifi-
able."); Culburt v. Sampson's Supermarkets, Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1982) (holding
that a plaintiff may recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress even if
the plaintiff suffered no physical injury).
61. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 363.
62. See id. at 364 (noting that "the great majority of courts have now repudiated the
requirement of 'impact' "); Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84, 85 (Pa. 1970) ("recovery
may be had from a negligent defendant, despite the fact that appellant's injuries arose in
the absence of actual impact").
63. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc) ("We
conclude, therefore, that damages for shock or mental anguish at witnessing an injury to
a third person, occasioned by a defendant's negligence are recoverable."); Asaro v. Cardi-
nal Glennon Memorial Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) ("We hold that
a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress resulting from observing physical injury to a
third person only if the plaintiff is within the zone of danger."); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461
N.E.2d 843, 850 (N.Y. 1984) (recognizing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress without impact or physical injury where the plaintiffs witness the injury of a close
family member and are in the zone of danger). The zone of danger rule is not very
relevant to this Note because transmission of AIDS requires some physical contact with
the virus, and thus a plaintiff will normally have sustained an impact or an injury. Be-
cause of the nature of the virus, it is unlikely that a person will fear developing AIDS in
the future simply by being in the zone of danger when someone else was infected.
64. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 364-65.
65. See, e.g., Jones v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 202 P. 919, 922 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921)
("that the mental suffering endured by plaintiff up to the time of the trial, due to her
reasonable apprehension of permanent disability (which reasonable apprehension was the
FEAR OF AIDS
Plaintiffs can satisfy the injury requirement in two ways. First, a plaintiff
may suffer physical injury and, subsequent to that injury, suffer emo-
tional distress. Second, a plaintiff may suffer such severe emotional dis-
tress that it causes physical injury.6 6
Fear-of-cancer cases are probably the most common example of plain-
tiffs claiming damages for fear of future illness. In examining this type of
claim, many courts have noted that the plaintiffs fulfilled the injury re-
quirement.67 In contrast, in cases in which a plaintiff claims damages for
fear of cancer but has sustained no physical injury, courts have pointed
to this fact in holding that the defendant had not breached any duty
owed to the plaintiff.6"
For the purposes of the injury requirement, there is no significant dif-
ference between fear-of-AIDS cases and cases involving fear of other dis-
eases. In both, many courts require a physical injury as a prerequisite to
a plaintiff recovering emotional distress damages.69 Because transmis-
proximate result of the accident), was an element to be considered by the jury in arriving
at its verdict"); Dulaney Inv. Co. v. Wood, 142 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
("Where the plaintiff has testified to a physical condition tending to show a partial loss of
use of one arm and one leg, since the accident, it was not error to permit him to testify to
his fear of paralysis.").
66. See eg., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) ("If, however, the plaintiff has not suffered an impact, the complained-of
mental distress must be 'manifested by physical injury.' ") (citations omitted); Payton v.
Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982) ("[A] plaintiff's physical harm must
either cause or be caused by the emotional distress alleged.").
67. Seae g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414 (5th Cir.)
("Under Mississippi law, damage awards for mental distress may be rendered when...
the plaintiff's mental suffering is accompanied by a physical injury."), cerL denied, 478
U.S. 1022 (1986); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1138 (5th Cir.
1985) ("Texas law permits the recovery of damages for mental anguish at least when
there is actual physical injury."); Griffin v. Keene Corp., No. 85 C 10748, 1990 WL
93292, at *3 (N.D. M. June 19, 1990) ("[P]laintiff has alleged that he suffered a direct
physical injury as a result of his exposure to defendants' products, and seeks to recover
for emotional distress resulting from this actual physical injury."); McAdams v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 638 F. Supp. 1173, 1175 (N.D. Il. 1986) ("Illinois courts have thus allowed recov-
ery for mental suffering when it accompanies a direct physical injury."); Mauro v.
Raymark Indus., Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 263 (N.J. 1989) (plaintiff who was exposed to asbes-
tos has a right to recover for reasonable fear of future disease if plaintiff sustained physi-
cal injury); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982)
("[W]here there is any physical injury at all-any attendant mental pain and suffering is
compensable.").
68. Eg., Deleski v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 819 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1987) (no recov-
ery for fear of cancer absent showing of impact or injury); Burns v. Jaquays Mining
Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (no recovery for fear of cancer when the
plaintiffs failed to show any physical injury); DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 744 P.2d 705,
710 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) ("Toxic substance cases are in general harmony with the rule
that damages may not be recovered for mental anguish absent proof of some present
physical harm or medically identifiable effect.").
69. See Steinhagen v. United States, 768 F. Supp 200, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("Hav-
ing found medical negligence and severe physical, psychological and economic damage to
Mrs. Steinhagen, the court will accordingly enter judgment for Plaintiff."); Johnson v.
West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (V. Va. 1991) ("[A]bsent physical
injury, there is no allowable recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress.");
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sion of AIDS requires a mixing of bodily fluids such as blood, it is not
surprising that most HIV-negative plaintiffs who have recovered dam-
ages for their fear of developing AIDS have sustained a physical injury.70
For example, in Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc.," a
police officer who was sent to subdue an AIDS patient suffered a physical
injury when the patient bit him.72 The Supreme Court of West Virginia
noted that this bite satisfied the injury requirement.73 Similarly, in
Kaehne v. Schmidt,74 the plaintiff was injured when he was involved in a
car accident. 75 Because he received unscreened blood as a result of this
accident, the plaintiff feared developing AIDS. 76 The court allowed re-
covery and stated that "[w]hen a tortfeasor's conduct causes bodily harm
for which he is liable, the tortfeasor is also liable for mental distress." 77
In cases in which HIV-negative plaintiffs have not sustained physical
injury, however, courts have held that the defendant was not liable for
the plaintiff's fear of future illness.78 For example, in Poole v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp. ,7 the wife of a deceased hemophiliac sued a company
that sold her husband an antihemophilic factor allegedly tainted with
HIV.Y° As part of this suit, Mrs. Poole attempted to recover for her fear
of developing AIDS.8" The court dismissed the claim because she could
not show any physical injury. 2
3. The Impact Requirement
In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover emotional dis-
tress damages, some courts have required that the plaintiff sustain some
Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in Westlaw, at
*I) ("When a tortfeasor's conduct causes bodily harm for which he is liable, the
tortfeasor is also liable for mental distress, including fear and anxiety, resulting from the
bodily harm.").
70. See, e.g., Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 1992)
(needle prick); Steinhagen v. United States, 768 F. Supp. 200, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(internal injuries from medical malpractice); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va. 1991) (bite on arm); Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in Westlaw, at *1) (injuries from car accident).
71. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
72. Id. at 892.
73. Id.
74. 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in Westlaw, at *1).
75. See id. at *2.
76. See id.
77. Id. at *1.
78. See, Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. I11. 1988); Fu-
neral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va.
1991).
79. 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 1371.
82. See id. ("[C]ourts have consistently refused to allow recovery for mental or emo-
tional distress in the absence of a physical injury or illness, and the complaint alleges
none.").
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physical impact as a result of the defendant's tortious conduct 8 3 The
impact test differs from the injury requirement. For example, consider a
case in which a person negligently drives a car and almost hits the plain-
tiff. Frightened by the near miss, the plaintiff suffers a heart attack. The
plaintiff has sustained a physical injury: a heart attack. Yet, the defend-
ant's negligent conduct has not caused any physical impact because the
car missed the plaintiff.
In theory, the impact requirement provides a circumstantial guarantee
that the plaintiff's alleged fear is genuine." Thus, plaintiffs who have
suffered even minimal impact have recovered emotional distress
damages.8 5
Most jurisdictions have now abandoned the impact requirement. 86 A
minority of courts, however, still applies this requirement in cases in
which plaintiffs claim damages for fear of developing a disease in the
future.87 For example, in assessing plaintiffs' claims for fear of develop-
ing cancer, some courts have examined whether the plaintiff sustained a
physical impact as a result of the defendant's tortious conduct.88
In analyzing fear-of-AIDS claims, the impact requirement is not a sub-
stantial factor. As in other fear-of-disease cases, almost all courts in fear-
of-AIDS cases have not applied the impact requirement.89
83. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 363.
84. See id at 363.
85. See e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978) (impact of
tubercle bacilli on lungs fulfills impact requirement).
86. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 364 (stating that "the great majority of courts have
now repudiated the requirement of 'impact' "). See also Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d
84, 85 (Pa. 1970) ("Today we decide that on the record before us, appellant may go to
trial and if he proves his allegations, recovery may be had from a negligent defendant,
despite the fact that appellant's injuries arose in the absence of actual impact.").
87. See e.g., Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1978).
88. See eg., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill.
1983) ("Illinois case law requires only a causal link between the fear of future injury and
the physical impact (as distinct from injury) of defendant's tortious conduct."); Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ('If the plain-
tiff has suffered an impact, Florida courts permit recovery for emotional distress stem-
ming from the incident during which the impact occurred and not merely the impact
itself.").
89. See generally Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1992);
Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991); Steinhagen v. United States,
768 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Bullock v. O'Leary, No. 88 C 10148, 1991 WL
206058 (N.D. IlL. Sept. 30, 1991); Hosford v. Estate of Campbell, 708 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1989); Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Poole v. Alpha Ther-
apeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840
P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); R.E.G. v. L.M.G. (In re the Marriage of REG.), 571
N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div. 1991);
Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992); McBarnette v. Feld-
man, 582 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987);
Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-CV-00232, 1992
WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991); Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (text available in Westlaw).
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4. Imposing a Duty in the Absence of Impact or Injury
In certain jurisdictions, in unusual circumstances, a plaintiff may have
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even
though the plaintiff has sustained neither physical injury nor impact."
For the plaintiff to prevail in these cases, the defendant must have
breached some duty of care owed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff must
have suffered severe emotional distress as a result of this breach.9 For
example, plaintiffs have recovered emotional distress damages after being
incorrectly informed that a close relative had died.92 Similarly, in Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,93 a woman recovered emotional distress
damages after her doctor misdiagnosed her as having syphilis.94 The
plaintiff was married, and the court found that it was "easily predictable
that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source would
produce marital discord."9"
In some jurisdictions, in circumstances similar to those in Molien, a
plaintiff who is erroneously informed that he is HIV positive may have a
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For exam-
ple, a court awarded $228,000 to a man who was falsely diagnosed as
being HIV positive.96 Similarly, doctors misdiagnosed two men as HIV
positive; these men suffered severe emotional distress as a result. 97 One
of the men underwent treatment for AIDS for six years before discover-
ing that he was not infected. 9s Although doctors believed that he had
HIV, they never tested him for AIDS.99 The other patient was diagnosed
as having AIDS because, as an intravenous drug user, he was a member
of a high-risk group."° In fact, doctors diagnosed him as having AIDS
90. See, e.g., Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538,
539 (N.Y. 1987) (plaintiff recovered emotional distress damages when doctors negligently
misinformed plaintiff that she needed an abortion, and she had an abortion).
91. See Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., 513 A.2d 66, 70 (Conn. 1986) (plaintiff can
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress even if plaintiff has sustained neither
physical injury nor impact) (citing Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 398
A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978)); Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr.,
512 N.E.2d 538, 539 (N.Y. 1987) ("Under these unusual circumstances, where there is a
breach of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, the breach of that duty resulting directly
in emotional harm is actionable."); Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334
(N.Y. 1983) ("[W]hen there is a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, breach of that duty
resulting directly in emotional harm is compensable even though no physical injury
occurred.").
92. E.g., Johnson v. State, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1975).
93. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
94. See id. at 821.
95. Id. at 817.
96. See Reynolds Holding, Man Angered to Learn AIDS Diagnosis Was False, S.F.
Chron., Oct. 23, 1992, at Al, A21.
97. See 2nd Claim Over AIDS Misdiagnosis, S.F. Chron., Dec. 1, 1992, at A20 [here-
inafter 2nd Claim]; Holding, supra note 96, at Al.
98. See Holding, supra note 96, at Al.
99. See id. at A21.
100. See 2nd Claim at A20.
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despite two negative AIDS tests. 10 1 In both of these cases, the patients
are precluded from bringing suit by their contracts with their medical
provider and are now seeking to recover damages via arbitration."°2
B. Negligence: Proximate Cause and the Reasonableness of a
Plaintiff's Fear of AIDS
Although courts may require a plaintiff to demonstrate injury before
trying a claim for fear of AIDS, fulfilling this requirement is insufficient
by itself to support recovery. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that
the defendant's tortious conduct proximately caused the plaintiff to fear
developing AIDS in the future.'0 3 In fear-of-AIDS cases, the proximate
cause inquiry revolves around the issue of whether the plaintiff's fear is
reasonable. Courts examine whether a plaintiff's fear of AIDS is reason-
able because defendants are not held liable for a plaintiff's unreasonable
fears."°4 Only reasonable fears are the proximate result of a defendant's
tortious conduct."0 s In determining whether a plaintiff's fear is reason-
able, courts commonly examine two elements. First, courts consider
whether the plaintiff can demonstrate any evidence of actual exposure to
the AIDS virus."°6 Second, courts examine whether the fear of AIDS
remains reasonable after the plaintiff receives an HIV-negative test
result. 1
07
1. The Exposure Requirement
In cases involving fear of developing AIDS, many courts require a
plaintiff to present evidence that the defendant actually exposed the
plaintiff to HIV °S Several HIV-negative plaintiffs who have recovered
damages have shown exposure to the virus."0 9
In cases involving fear of AIDS, courts have not clearly indicated
101. See id.
102. See Id; Holding, supra note 96, at Al, A21.
103. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 165 (stating that a plaintiff must demonstrate a
"reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury").
104. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (plaintiffs may only recover
for fear of AIDS "for the periods constituting their reasonable window of anxiety"); Fu-
neral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991)
(noting that unreasonable fear of AIDS is not compensable).
105. See, eg., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (in cases involving fear of disease, proximate cause "demands a reasonable fear");
Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 894 (W. Va. 1991) (in
analyzing whether the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff to fear AIDS, the court
examined whether the plaintiff's fear was reasonable).
106. See infra notes 108-53 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W.
Va. 1991) ("[B]efore a recovery for emotional distress damages may be made due to a fear
of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there must first be exposure to the disease.").
109. See Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 1992) (plain-
tiff stuck by needle while he was wearing plastic gloves covered with HIV-infected blood);
Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (,V. Va. 1991) (plaintiff
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whether the exposure requirement is an issue of proximate cause or the
defendant's duty. Because evidence of exposure bears on the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's fear of future infection, it appears to be an issue of
proximate cause.11o
Several factors indicate that the exposure requirement is a question of
proximate cause. First, at least one court clearly views exposure in fear-
of-AIDS cases as a question of proximate cause.' In Carroll v. Sisters
of Saint Francis Health Services, Inc.,112 the plaintiff was permitted to
proceed with a cause of action alleging damages for fear of AIDS even
though she did not present any evidence of exposure to HIV." 3 The
court indicated that the question to be resolved was the overall reasona-
bleness of the plaintiff's fear and that evidence of exposure was one ele-
ment in determining the reasonableness of the fear.I14 Similarly, in Faya
v. Almarez,115 the Maryland Court of Appeals indicated that the expo-
sure requirement is an issue of proximate cause, not the defendant's
duty. 16 In Faya, the appeals court reversed two trial court decisions that
granted motions to dismiss claims for emotional distress damages for fear
of AIDS. 17 In holding that plaintiffs who failed to allege actual expo-
sure to HIV could survive a motion to dismiss, the appeals court indi-
cated that evidence of exposure went to the reasonableness of the
plaintiff's fear, not the scope of the defendant's duty. 18
Second, most courts analyze the issue of exposure to HIV in the con-
text of examining the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear.' 19 These courts
apparently view a plaintiff's fear as unreasonable, and therefore not prox-
imately caused by the defendant's breach, if the plaintiff cannot produce
evidence of actual exposure to HIV. Thus it can be inferred that when
courts have granted motions for summary judgment, because a plaintiff
has not presented any evidence of exposure to the virus, the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's fear is not a material issue of fact.'
Third, if exposure were a question of duty, it would require a modifica-
tion of the impact and injury requirements in several jurisdictions be-
bitten by HIV-positive person); see also AIDS, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at S3 (discussing
Christian v. Sheft, C574 153 (Cal. Super. Ct.)).
110. See supra note 105.
111. See Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02AO-91 10-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
112. No. 02A01-91 10-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
113. See id. at *3, *5.
114. See id. at *4.
115. 620 A.2d 327, 330, 339 (Md. 1993).
116. See id. at 327, 330, 339.
117. See id. at 339.
118. See id. at 336-39.
119. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Hare v.
State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. 413 S.E.2d
889, 893 (W. Va. 1991); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991).
120. See, e.g., Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 286 (plaintiff tested negative five times).
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cause plaintiffs who have been denied damages for fear of AIDS (because
they could not prove exposure) have been able to show some physical
impact or injury.12 1 It is unlikely that these courts intended to create an
exception to the impact or injury rules. Such an exception would hold
that a defendant who has caused a plaintiff to suffer an injury or impact
has violated a duty not to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress
generally but has not violated a duty not to cause a plaintiff to fear
AIDS.
Courts have dismissed most cases in which plaintiffs have failed to
present any evidence of actual exposure to HIV.' z Although these
plaintiffs may potentially have been exposed to the AIDS virus, they
have not recovered because they have been unable to provide any evi-
dence that the virus was actually present.'" For example, in Burk v.
Sage Products, Inc., 2 4 a paramedic stuck his hand on a used needle.,'
Thus, he was potentially exposed to HIV because, if the needle were con-
taminated with the virus, he could become infected.' 26 The court, how-
ever, refused to allow a claim based on potential exposure and required
the plaintiff to present evidence indicating that the needle was, in fact,
contaminated with infected blood.127 The plaintiff presented no such evi-
dence and the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. 2 Most courts view the failure to present any evidence of actual
exposure to HIV as dispositive of whether the plaintiff's fear of develop-
ing AIDS is reasonable. 2 9
In three sets of almost identical cases, HIV-negative plaintiffs who
have presented evidence of actual exposure to the virus have recovered
for their fear of AIDS, and plaintiffs who could not produce any evidence
of actual exposure have not recovered. In Johnson v. West Virginia Uni-
121. See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 285 (plaintiff stuck with needle); Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at
126 (plaintiff bitten on arm).
122. See, e.g., Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (hospital worker bitten by an inmate could
not recover when "there was no proof adduced at trial establishing that the inmate was
infected with AIDS"); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79, 83 (W. Va. 1991) ("[B]efore a recovery for emotional distress damages may be
made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such as AIDS, there must first be exposure to
the disease. If there is no exposure, damages will be denied.") (citing Johnson v. West
Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991)).
123. See supra note 122.
124. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
125. See iL at 286.
126. See Alan, R. Lifson, Do Alternate Modes for Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Exist? A Review, 259 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1353, 1353 (1988) (indicating
that a person can be infected with HIV by using a contaminated needle).
127. See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (F-D. Pa. 1990) ("[P]laintiff
cannot demonstrate that he was actually exposed to the AIDS virus because he cannot
prove that the needle with which he was stuck was a needle that was used on an AIDS
patient.").
128. See id. at 288.




versity Hospitals, Inc.,13° the Supreme Court of West Virginia held that a
jury correctly awarded damages for fear of AIDS to a police officer when
an HIV-positive hospital patient bit himself and then, with infected blood
on his teeth, bit the officer.13 Emphasizing the importance of the expo-
sure requirement, the court found that "before a recovery for emotional
distress damages may be made due to a fear of contracting a disease, such
as AIDS, there must first be exposure to the disease."' 32 In contrast, a
court denied recovery in a case in which a prison inmate who was bleed-
ing after stabbing himself in the neck with a fork bit an X-ray techni-
cian.133 The technician was denied recovery because "no proof was
adduced at trial establishing that the inmate was infected with AIDS."' 34
In Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, U.S.A., Inc.,13 5 a nurse won damages for his
fear of developing AIDS when an improperly packaged hypodermic nee-
dle stuck his hand while he was wearing plastic gloves splattered with
HIV-contaminated blood. 36 Yet, in Burk v. Sage Products, Inc., 3 7 the
court granted summary judgment against a paramedic who stuck his
hand on a used and discarded needle. 13' The paramedic did not recover
because he failed to present any evidence that the needle was used on an
AIDS patient. 139
In Christian v. Sheft,1 ° Rock Hudson's homosexual lover recovered
damages from Mr. Hudson's estate for his fear of developing AIDS.' 4 '
But in R.E.G. v. L.M.G. (In re the Marriage of R.E.G.), 42 the court de-
nied recovery when a wife sought to recover emotional distress damages
after she discovered that her husband had engaged in homosexual rela-
tionships. 4 3 Because the husband had repeatedly tested HIV nega-
tive, the wife could not demonstrate actual exposure to HIV.145
At least one court, however, has rejected the requirement that a plain-
130. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
131. See id. at 891, 897.
132. Id. at 893. The same court applied the exposure requirement and denied recovery
to a mortician who worked on an HIV-infected corpse but could not demonstrate any
evidence of exposure to HIV. See Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Commu-
nity Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991). The court distinguished this case from
Johnson: "Plaintiff's position is in marked contrast to the other situations where recov-
ery for fear of contracting a disease has been held compensable, in that plaintiff in this
case is unable to demonstrate an exposure to a disease-causing agent." Id. at 83.
133. Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 125-27 (App. Div. 1991).
134. Id. at 127.
135. 974 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1992).
136. See id. at 599.
137. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
138. See id. at 288.
139. See id. at 287-88.
140. See AIDS, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at S3 (discussing Christian v. Sheft, C574 153
(Cal. Super. Ct.)).
141. See id.
142. 571 N.E.2d 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
143. See id. at 300.
144. See id. at 302.
145. See id. at 303.
[Vol. 62
FEAR OF AIDS
tiff must present some evidence of actual exposure to HIV. In Carroll v.
Sisters of Saint Francis Health Services, Inc., 11 a Tennessee appeals court
held that a plaintiff could pursue a cause of action alleging damages for
fear of AIDS even when she presented no evidence of actual exposure to
the virus.147 In Carroll, a woman who was visiting a relative in a hospital
stuck her hand on several needles in a contaminated needle receptacle
that she mistook for a paper towel holder."' The trial court granted
partial summary judgment against the plaintiff because she did not pres-
ent any evidence that the needles were contaminated with IV-infected
blood. 49 The appeals court reversed, expressly declining to apply "the
strict rules of actual exposure" that require a plaintiff to show evidence of
exposure before proceeding with a claim for fear of AIDS. t1 ° Rather, the
appeals court stated that proof of exposure was only a factor in consider-
ing the overall reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear of disease. 5 ' The
court noted that summary judgment was inappropriate because a mate-
rial issue of fact remained as to whether the plaintiff's fear of future ill-
ness was reasonable.1 52 It concluded that this was a question for a jury,
rather than a matter that could be decided on a summary judgment
motion. 153
2. Overall Reasonableness
The final question that courts must address in fear-of-AIDS cases is
whether the plaintiff's emotional distress is reasonable. As discussed
previously, courts may require a plaintiff to show injury,15 impact, 155
evidence of exposure to HIV, 156 or some combination of these ele-
ments.1 57 But, by themselves, these are insufficient grounds for recovery.
Courts also assess the overall reasonableness of the plaintiff's claim, al-
lowing recovery only in cases in which a plaintiff's fear is reasonable,'
146. No. 02A01-9100-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4 (Tenn. C. App. Oct. 12,
1992).
147. See id. at *4-5. The court squarely addressed the question of whether exposure
was required when it stated that the primary issue in the case was: "whether plaintiff can
recover for emotional distress caused by fear of contracting AIDS without proof that
plaintiff was exposed to the AIDS virus." Id at *3.
148. See id at *1.
149. See id at *2 ("The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff could not recover for her fear of contracting AIDS without proof that she
was actually exposed to the AIDS virus.").
150. See id. at *4-5.
151. See id. at *4.
152. See id. at *5.
153. See id
154. See supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 108-53 and accompanying text.
157. See eg., Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892-93 (NV.
Va. 1991) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate both injury and exposure before allowing
recovery for fear of AIDS).
158. See4 eg., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559-60 (N.D.
M11. 983) (recognizing that plaintiffs who were improperly exposed to DES must show
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and denying recovery in cases in which the plaintiff's fear is
unreasonable. 159
The overall reasonableness inquiry could be particularly significant in
fear-of-AIDS cases because AIDS tests are accurate predictors of future
infection 1'6 and because the scientific community continually scrutinizes
the reliability of AIDS tests. 16' As a result, fear-of-AIDS cases differ
from other fear of disease suits. In a case in which a plaintiff claims
damages for fear of a disease other than AIDS, there may be no accurate,
current information that the court can use to determine the probability
that the plaintiff will develop the disease. 62 In contrast, a court deciding
a fear-of-AIDS claim can refer to a plethora of current data.
In analyzing the overall reasonableness of HIV-negative plaintiffs'
fear-of-AIDS claims, this Note follows the same two inquiries that courts
appear to apply. First, what is the probability that the plaintiff will de-
velop the feared future illness or injury?163  Second, given this
both physical impact and reasonableness of fear); Jones v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 202 P.
919, 922 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (plaintiff injured because of defendant's negligence
could recover for "her reasonable apprehension of permanent disability"); Petriello v.
Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 481 (Conn. 1990) (in medical malpractice action, finding plain-
tiff's fear of future bowel obstruction was reasonable); Walker v. Boston & Me. R.R., 51
A. 918, 919 (N.H. 1902) ("Upon the question of damages for future physical and mental
pain, the jury were limited by the instructions given to such suffering as was shown to the
direct, natural, and probable result of the defendant's fault."); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152
N.E.2d 249, 253 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing plaintiff to recover for reasonable fear of cancer).
159. See Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 52 S.E. 152, 153 (Ga. 1905) (The plaintiff
"may not continue for an indefinite period to vex his soul with dread on account of
having been 'cut on the inside,' and hold the defendant liable for his apprehensions.");
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Davis, 250 S.W. 978, 979 (Ky. 1923) (holding that the trial
court committed an error in allowing plaintiff who was injured in a car accident to testify
regarding his fear of possible blood poisoning and fear of being crippled since these fears
"were altogether groundless, and never materialized"); Winik v. Jewish Hosp. of Brook-
lyn, 293 N.E.2d 95, 95 (N.Y. 1972) (no recovery for fear of cancer when all doctors that
plaintiff consulted informed her that there was no risk of cancer); Howard v. Mount Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974) (no recovery for fear of cancer when fear was
not reasonable).
160. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIVInfection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., 509, 510 (Aug. 14,
1987) (indicating that current AIDS tests are 99% reliable under "optimal laboratory
conditions").
16 1. See id.; Interpretation and Use of the Western Block Assay for Serodiagnosis of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I Infections, 38 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep.
1 (July 21, 1989); Thomas R. O'Brien et al., Testing for Antibodies to Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus Type 2 in the United States, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. I(July 17, 1992).
162. See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 481 (Conn. 1990) (different experts
testified to different probabilities that plaintiff would develop bowel obstruction).
163. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (stating that plaintiff need only demonstrate "a reasonable fear, not a high degree
of likelihood, that the feared contingency be likely to occur"); Heider v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 231 So. 2d 438, 441-42 (La. Ct. App. 1970) ("The medical experts
were of the opinion that there was a 2% to 5% chance that one with injuries such as Mrs.
Heider's would experience epileptic seizures in years to come.").
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probability, is the plaintiff's fear reasonable?"'
a. Assessing the Probability of HIV Infection
Two factors complicate the inquiry into whether it is reasonable for an
HIV-negative plaintiff to fear developing AIDS. First, testing for EIIV
infection is not viable until approximately three months following expo-
sure to the virus.16 Thus it is necessary to assess a plaintiff's fear for
both the period of time before the virus is detectable and the period after
which testing becomes viable. Second, there are different tests for differ-
ent strains of the virus. 66
It is important to distinguish between a plaintiff's fear immediately
after being exposed to HIV and a plaintiff's fear after testing for HIV
becomes possible. Even if a plaintiff were, in fact, infected with HIV, the
current tests could not detect the virus until approximately three months
after exposure.1 67 Thus a plaintiff exposed to HIV may harbor a reason-
able fear of AIDS for the three months immediately following exposure
because there is no way to determine whether the plaintiff is infected.'
When HIV tests become viable, it is substantially more difficult to as-
sess the overall reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear because there are sev-
eral strains of the virus, several different tests for the virus, and a
plethora of data concerning the reliability of each test. By far the most
common HIV strain in the United States is HIV Type 1,169 and most
164. See e.g., Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393, 401-02 (Neb. 1964) (upholding
award for emotional distress damages and noting that a physician's statement that a
plaintiff's injuries "'might' develop into cancer is a reasonable basis for a patient to have
anxiety about the possibility of developing cancer").
165. See supra note 19. At this point, it is helpful to distinguish between detectability
of HIV and evidence of AIDS symptoms. HIV is the virus that causes AIDS, and this
virus can be detected approximately three months after a person has become infected.
See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV
Infection andAIDS, Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 509 (Aug. 14, 1987). How-
ever, a person who is infected with HIV may not demonstrate any AIDS symptoms until
several years after being infected. See id
166. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
167. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 509 (Aug. 14,
1987) ("Persons exposed to HIV usually develop detectable levels of antibody against the
virus within 6-12 weeks of infection.").
168. See John P. Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus;
Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 199
(1988) ("[A]n uninfected person who was exposed to HIV should be able to recover for
the fear of AIDS the person suffered before discovering that he did not carry HIV.").
Further, there is a striking similarity between a claim for fear of AIDS when there is no
reliable method for determining infection and older cases involving fear of rabies. See.
eg., Ayers v. Macoughtry, 117 P. 1088, 1088 (Okla. 1911) ("by reason of the fact that it
was impossible at the time to ascertain whether or not a dog has rabies or hydrophobia,
plaintiff suffered great mental pain, and was put in fear of his life by reason of his appre-
hension of said wounds causing the said disease").
169. See Testing for Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2 in the
United States, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 2 (July 17, 1992) (stating that
incidents of HIV-2 are extremely rare in the United States).
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AIDS tests given in this country are designed to detect this strain.170
When a person is tested for HIV, the blood sample is given an initial
test. 1 7 1 This test is more than 99% reliable "under optimal laboratory
conditions."1 72  If the initial test result is negative, usually no further
tests are performed. 173 At this point, a false negative (that is, a negative
result when the person is, in fact, infected) would most likely occur be-
cause the person took the test too soon after exposure to the virus. 174 If
the initial test indicates HIV infection, the procedure is repeated using
the same test. ' 75 If the results of these retests indicate infection, the sam-
ple is analyzed using a second type of test.'76 Although the second test
uses a different method for determining infection, the two tests are com-
parably reliable. 177 When these two tests are used in combination, a false
positive result is extremely improbable.178 Yet, even the most accurate
tests cannot guard against human error, which is probably the primary
cause of test inaccuracy. 79
The second strain of the virus, HIV Type 2, is so rare in the United
States that the Centers for Disease Control do "not recommend routine
testing for HIV-2... in settings other than blood centers."' 80 Although
HIV-2 is endemic in parts of West Africa and has been increasingly com-
mon in France and Portugal,' 8' the Centers for Disease Control only
170. See id.
171. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIVInfection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 510 (Aug. 14,
1987). Although the names of the tests may differ, the first test is normally called an
"EIA" test and the second is commonly called a "Western Blot" test. See id.; Interpreta-
tion and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type 1 Infections, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. (July 21, 1989).
172. Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent




175. See id.; Interpretation and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infections, 38 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep.
1, 1 (July 21, 1989).
176. See Public Health Service Guidelinesfor Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIVInfection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 510 (Aug. 14,
1987); Interpretation and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human Im-
munodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infections, 38 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 1 (July
21, 1989).
177. See Public Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Pre-
vent HIVInfection and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 509, 510 (Aug. 14,
1987).
178. See id. ("Under ideal circumstances, the probability that a testing sequence will be
falsely positive in a population with a low rate of infection ranges from less than 1 in
100,000 ... to an estimated 5 in 100,000.").
179. See id.
180. See Testing for Antibodies to Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2 in the
United States, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 3-4 (July 17, 1992) ("Since 1987,
32 persons with HIV-2 infection have been reported in the United States.").
181. See id. at 2-3.
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recommend special testing for this strain when specific facts indicate a
possibility of exposure to HIV-2.'8 2 If a person infected with HIV-2
takes the standard HIV-1 test available at most U.S. testing facilities,
there is between a 60% and 91% chance that the test will detect the
Virus.18 3 In contrast, the test specifically designed to detect HIV-2 infec-
tion is more than 99% reliable."' Finally, there may be at least one new
strain of the virus that cannot be detected using any of the current
tests. 185 As of July 1992, twenty-one people worldwide had shown signs
of AIDS without testing positive for any known strain of the virus.'8 6
As these data indicate, it is difficult to ascertain the exact probability
that an HIV-negative plaintiff is infected. HIV tests are very accurate
compared with tests for other diseases, and a negative result would indi-
cate a greater than 99% probability that the plaintiff is not infected.'8" A
plaintiff, however, can make several arguments that the probability of
infection is greater than it may initially appear: the disease might not
have been detectable at the time of the test; 88 the test might not have
been performed under ideal conditions; the test may be inaccurate be-
cause of human error; 8 9 the plaintiff may be infected with HIV-2, and
the test the plaintiff received could not accurately detect this strain of the
virus;19' and the plaintiff may be infected with an undetectable strain of
the virus' 91
b. Assessing the Reasonableness of the Fear
After a court has examined the probability that a plaintiff who tests
HIV negative may develop AIDS, it then must determine whether the
plaintiff's fear is reasonable. In fear-of-disease cases, courts have not ap-
plied a uniform standard in assessing whether a plaintiff's fear is
reasonable.
The most permissive standard that courts have applied in fear-of-dis-
ease cases eschews any inquiry into the probability of future infection. In
these cases, plaintiffs have recovered damages for emotional distress that
bears no rational relationship to the probability of future infection. 192
182. See id at 4.
183. See id at 3.
184. See id
185. Unexplained CD4+ T-Lymphocyte Depletion in Person Without Evident HIV In-
fection-United States, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 541, 541-45 (July 31,
1992).
186. Id at 541.
187. See supra note 172.
188. See supra note 167.
189. See supra note 179.
190. See supra note 183.
191. See supra note 185.
192. See. eg., Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918, 920 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (When female
plaintiff sustained injury to her breasts after a car accident caused by defendant's negli-
gence, the court allowed plaintiff to recover for emotional distress, including fear of can-
cer, even though plaintiff's expert testified that "he never saw anything about her injuries
1993]
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Under this standard, HIV-negative plaintiffs would recover for their fear
of AIDS, although their fear might be entirely irrational. 193
Some courts have allowed recovery for fear of a future illness that
"might" occur 194 or a possible illness that "cannot be ruled out."' 195
Under these standards, HIV-negative plaintiffs who demonstrate expo-
sure to the virus probably would be able to recover. Given that an indi-
vidual who tests HIV negative could still be infected with some strain of
the virus, such plaintiffs "might" develop AIDS in the future, and the
possibility of future illness cannot be ruled out.
New York courts use a totality-of-the-circumstances test that exam-
ines whether there are factual guarantees that the plaintiff's claim is rea-
sonable. 96 Under this approach, whether a plaintiff could recover for
fear of AIDS would depend on all the circumstances, including whether
the plaintiff has tested HIV negative.197
The Supreme Court of Kansas articulated a stricter standard for plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for fear of future injury.1 98 While stating that the
plaintiff need not show that the feared injury or illness is "a medical
certainty or probability," the court required "a showing that a substan-
tial possibility exists for such an occurrence."' 99 The court went on to
say that damages for fear are "not recoverable when the future event is
highly unlikely." 2" Under this "substantial possibility" test, 14IV-nega-
tive plaintiffs probably could not recover for fear of developing AIDS
because tests are sufficiently accurate that a negative result eliminates
any substantial possibility of infection.
Also, because AIDS is a fatal, degenerative disease, the grave conse-
quences of infection may be a factor in determining whether a plaintiff's
fear is reasonable. Even a slim probability of infection with a fatal dis-
ease may create a reasonable fear.2° '
Given these differing standards, it is not surprising that courts have
assessed the importance of a negative AIDS test differently. One court
stated that plaintiffs can only recover damages for fear of AIDS for the
that should give her any reason to apprehend cancer."); Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 418
A.2d 480, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (In case in which plaintiff was severely stabbed, the
court granted recovery for emotional damages, including plaintiff's "constant fear of can-
cer, heart attack, and an early death, despite assurances of her doctors to the contrary.").
193. Cf id.
194. See Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Neb. 1964).
195. Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (Conn. 1947).
196. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1958).
197. See Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991) (rejecting plaintiff's
claim and noting "the claimant himself was tested for AIDS several times with negative
results").
198. See Tamplin v. Star Lumber & Supply Co., 836 P.2d 1102, 1108 (Kan. 1992).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Cf Ayers v. Macoughtry, 117 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Okla. 1911) ("Likewise it is a
matter of general knowledge that one of the most horrible forms in which death can visit
humanity is that of hydrophobia, and that this is incurred by being bitten by dogs which
have it.").
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period of time before testing becomes viable.2"2 Several courts have rec-
ognized that, where a plaintiff has tested HIV negative, it was very im-
probable that the plaintiff was infected.3 These courts have used this
fact as a major factor in determining that the plaintiff's fear was unrea-
sonable.2' 4 Other courts have allowed recovery for fear even though the
plaintiff has tested HIV negative more than three months after expo-
sure. 05 Finally, some courts have refused to recognize the reliability of
the tests.2°6
C. Intentional Torts
The previous section examined many of the elements necessary for
bringing a negligence claim alleging fear-of-AIDS damages. Similar to
negligence claims, plaintiffs can recover damages for fear of future illness
or injury as a result of a defendant's intentional tort. In cases involving
fear of AIDS, the intentional tort would almost always be either battery
or intentional infliction of emotional distress. A person who commits an
intentional tort is liable for injuries resulting from that tort. In cases in
which an HIV-negative plaintiff brings a cause of action alleging an in-
tentional tort and claiming damages for fear of AIDS, the causality anal-
ysis involves the issues of exposure 7 and the overall reasonableness of
the plaintiff's fear.20 8
202. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 & n.10 (Md. 1993).
203. See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (F-D. Pa. 1990) (stating that
it "is extremely unlikely that a patient who tests HIV-negative more than six months
after a potential exposure will contract the disease as a result of that exposure"); Hare v.
State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991) (noting that "the claimant himself was
tested for AIDS several times with negative results" and thus "the evidence adduced with
respect to the claimant's emotional distress was remote and speculative").
204. See supra note 203.
205. See Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va.
1991) (in a case in which exposure occurred three years previously, finding that plaintiff's
continuing fear of AIDS is reasonable even though the plaintiff "is regularly tested for
AIDS" but has not contracted HIV); AIDS, Nat'l LJ., Jan. 29, 1990, at S3 (discussing
Christian v. Sheft, C574 153 (Cal. Super. Ct.)) ("So far Mr. Christian has tested negative
for the acquired immune deficiency syndrome virus, but in his lawsuit he claimed great
emotional distress caused by the continual fear that he may contract the disease."); see
also Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-Cv-00232,
1992 WL 276717, at *2 (Tenn. CL App. Oct. 12, 1992) (allowing plaintiff to pursue a
claim for fear of AIDS even though over several years "HIV tests were performed on
several occasios... and were all negative").
206. See R.E.G. v. L.M.G. (In re the Marriage of R.E.G.), 571 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1991) (The court refused "to take judicial notice of these materials which indi-
cate that HIV is 99% detectable within three months' time and a false negative test for
HIV is remote."); Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-
Cv-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4 (Tenn. CL App. Oct. 12, 1992) ("AIDS testing is not
susceptible of the same degree of certitude as is testing for other pathogens.").
207. See supra text accompanying notes 108-53.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 154-206.
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1. Battery
Transmission of a disease may constitute an intentional tort for which
a plaintiff can recover damages.2 9 Cases in which a defendant has inten-
tionally transmitted a disease are unusual. Battery causes of action occa-
sionally arise, however, in cases involving transmission of venereal
diseases, because a person's consent to sexual contact is vitiated' when
that person's partner fails to disclose the fact that he is infected with a
venereal disease.210 When consent is vitiated, the sexual contact consti-
tutes a battery.211 Once a plaintiff has established a valid battery cause of
action, a defendant is liable for all emotional damages resulting from the
tortious conduct. 212
This raises the issue of whether a plaintiff can recover damages for fear
of disease resulting from a battery when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate
actual infection with the virus. In a fear-of-AIDS context, such a situa-
tion would likely arise in two ways. First, a person might deliberately
attempt to infect someone with the virus. 21 In such a case, if an HIV-
negative plaintiff were to claim damages for fear of AIDS, the issue
would be whether the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff's fear.2 4
The causality analysis would require courts to examine whether the de-
fendant actually exposed the plaintiff to HIV and whether the plain-
tiff's fear is reasonable. 216
Second, an HIV-negative plaintiff may have had sex with a person who
did not reveal the fact that he was HIV positive. Currently, there are no
cases that directly address this point. The theory underlying a battery
claim in these circumstances is that the plaintiff did not make an in-
formed consent.217 Thus, an HIV-negative plaintiff claiming damages for
209. See, Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
210. Keeton, supra note 40, at 120. See also Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 277 ("The
basic premise underlying these old cases--consent to sexual intercourse vitiated by one
partner's fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with venereal disease-is equally
applicable today, whether or not the partners involved are married to each other.");
Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E. 206, 207 (N.C. 1920) ("It was a far greater assault for the
husband to communicate to his wife ... a foul and loathsome disease, which has caused
her serious bodily injury, and which medical books hold to be a permanent injury of
which she can never be entirely cured."); De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936) (transmission of genital crabs vitiates consent).
211. See supra note 210.
212. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 57 ("But if some independent tort, such as assault,
battery, false imprisonment, or seduction could be made out, the cause of action served as
a peg upon which to hang the mental damages and recovery was freely permitted.")
(citations omitted).
213. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (HIV-positive
defendant threw his feces at a prison guard, hitting the guard in the face). Although
Brown is a criminal assault case, these facts would likely constitute a civil claim for
battery.
214. See supra notes 103-206 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 108-53 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 154-206 and accompanying text.
217. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 119 ("A plaintiff' cannot ordinarily be regarded as
actually consenting to the defendant's conduct if the plaintiff assented to the conduct
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fear of AIDS could claim that he would not have consented to sexual
relations if he knew that the defendant was HIV positive.2"' In the cases
that have recognized a battery in similar situations, however, the plaintiff
has actually contracted the disease.219 It is unclear whether courts will
expand this concept of battery to embrace cases in which the plaintiff was
exposed to a disease but failed to produce evidence of actual infection.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In rare circumstances, an HIV-negative plaintiff can claim damages for
fear of AIDS based on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.' 0 Like emotional distress damages in other tort actions, courts
have been reluctant to allow recovery for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress." 1 Modem courts, however, have allowed recovery for
emotional distress without physical injuries in extreme or outrageous cir-
cumstances.' Courts have allowed recovery in cases in which a person
has deliberately lied to the plaintiff and the circumstances rendered this
conduct outrageous.- 3
In cases in which an HIv-negative plaintiff fears developing AIDS,
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims have arisen in two
ways. First, in Whelan v. Whelan,' 4 a husband who had engaged in
sexual relations with his wife told her that he was HIV positive, knowing
that, in fact, he was not.' 5 Under these facts, the court found that the
while mistaken about the nature and quality of the invasion intended by the defendant.")
(citations omitted).
218. Cf Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (a
battery case involving herpes).
219. See supra note 210.
220. See e.g., Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. CL 1991) (woman
brings intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against her husband after he delib-
erately lied to her by saying that he had AIDS).
221. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 55 ("[I]t has been said that mental consequences are
so evanescent, intangible, and peculiar, and vary to such an extent with the individual
concerned, that they cannot be anticipated, and so lie outside the boundaries of any rea-
sonable 'proximate' connection with the act of the defendant.") (citations omitted); id. at
56 ("The most cogent objection to the protection of such interests lies in the 'wide door'
which might be opened, not only to fictitious claims, but to litigation in the field of trivial-
ities and mere bad manners."); id. at 55 (" 'Mental pain or anxiety,' said Lord Wen-
sleydale in a famous English case, 'the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act causes that alone.' ") (quoting from Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.LC
577, 598 (1861)).
222. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 60 ("[T]he rule which seems to have emerged is that
there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a
nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very
serious kind.") (citations omitted); see also Daniels v. Adkins Protective Serv., Inc., 247
So. 2d 710, 711 (Miss. 1971) ("[D]amages are recoverable for mental pain and anguish by
a willful, wanton, malicious or intentional wrong even though no bodily injury was sus-
tained.") (citations omitted).
223. See eg., Savage v. Boies, 272 P.2d 349, 350 (Ariz. 1954) (falsely informing a
woman that her husband and child were injured).
224. 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
225. See id. at 252.
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plaintiff had a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.22 6 The Whelan court's decision is consistent with traditional views
regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant's
conduct exceeded "all bounds usually tolerated by decent society.t 227 By
lying to his wife and telling her that he was dying of AIDS, the defend-
ant's conduct went far beyond "the field of trivialities and mere bad man-
ners." '228 Unlike cases in which the mental distress may "lie outside the
boundaries of any reasonable 'proximate' connection, '229 it is a natural,
probable, foreseeable consequence that the plaintiff would endure severe
emotional distress after being falsely informed that her husband had ex-
posed her to a deadly disease. Thus, allowing recovery for emotional
distress under these circumstances would not lead to a flood of litigation.
Second, in Baranowski v. Torre,230 the defendant, who had engaged in
homosexual relations with the plaintiff, falsely informed the plaintiff that
it was unlikely that he, the defendant, was HIV positive.231 In this case,
the defendant misinformed the plaintiff by stating that the defendant's
previous homosexual lover had died of cancer when, in fact, he had died
of AIDS.232 As in the previous example, the defendant deliberately lied
in outrageous circumstances. Thus the court found "that probable cause
exist[ed] that the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
would be sustained. '233
The Baranowski court may have erred in permitting the plaintiff to
pursue a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because the defendant's lie did not cause the plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress. In a usual action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
defendant has told a deliberate lie, and this lie has caused the plaintiff's
mental damages.234 In contrast, the plaintiff in Baranowski suffered no
emotional distress from the defendant's alleged lie that the defendant's
former lover had died from cancer. 23" Rather, the plaintiff suffered emo-
tional distress when he discovered the truth.236 Thus, a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress may be inappropriate under these
facts.
II. DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM OF THE REASONING APPLIED BY
COURTS IN FEAR-OF-AIDS CASES
Many of the arguments for limiting recovery for emotional distress
226. Id. at 252-53.
227. Keeton, supra note 40, at 60.
228. Id. at 56.
229. Id. at 55.
230. No. CV90-0236178, 1991 WL 240460 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 7, 1991).
231. See id. at * 1.
232. See id. at * 1.
233. Id. at *2.
234. See supra note 223.
235. See Baranowski, 1991 WL 240460 at *2.
236. Id. at *1.
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damages are applicable in cases involving claims for fear of AIDS.
Courts should closely scrutinize these claims and should prevent plain-
tiffs from bringing suits for trivial harms" 7 or from bringing false
claims." 8 Also, there may be an attenuated link between a defendant's
actions and a plaintiff's claimed damages, and thus it could be unfair to
hold the defendant liable for these damages.3 9 In addition, the plain-
tiff's damages might not be the proximate result of defendant's tortious
conduct.2' Further, allowing HIV-negative plaintiffs to recover for their
fear of AIDS might provoke a deluge of litigation.24" '
Strong public policy reasons indicate that courts should limit HIV-
negative plaintiffs' ability to recover for fear of AIDS. AIDS is a fatal
disease that has reached epidemic proportions.242 Given the natural fear
that people have of this disease, allowing liberal recovery24 3 will en-
courage individuals who wrongly believe that they have been exposed to
HIV to bring suits alleging emotional damages. Many people are mis-
informed about how AIDS is transmitted, and they may incorrectly be-
lieve that they have been exposed to the virus. 2 " Further, public
ignorance and fear may lead to improper jury verdicts. Jurors who har-
bor an irrational fear of AIDS may be inclined to award emotional dis-
tress damages even in cases in which the plaintiff's fear is unreasonable.
Given all of these potential problems, courts have used a variety of
rationales to preclude plaintiffs from recovering for fear of AIDS.245
237. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 360-61.
238. See id
239. See id, at 361; Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis.
1974) ("In this case, although there is no question about there being in fact a fear of
future cancer, the claim of damages (by way of cancer) is so remote and is too out of
proportion to the culpability of the tort-feasor.").
240. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361.
241. See id
242. See Gerald Friedland et al., Additional Evidence for Lack of Transmission of HV
Infection by Close Interpersonal (Casual) Contact, AIDS, 639, 642 (1990) ("An estimated
1.5-2 million Americans and over 5 million people worldwide have become infected with
HIV.") (footnotes omitted).
243. See Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va.
1991) (plaintiff recovered $1.9 million); AIDS, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at S3 (discussing
Christian v. Sheft, C574 153 (Cal. Super. Ct.)) (plaintiff originally awarded $21.75 mil-
lion, later reduced to $5.5 million).
244. See Friedland et al., supra note 242, at 642 (noting that "a significant proportion
of the population also continues to hold misconceptions about transmission by casual
contact"). The article states: "78% [of the public] believed that transmission occurred
through the use of public toilets, 19% by drinking from a carrier's glass, and 15% from
hospitalization close to AIDS patients." Id
245. See, e.g., Seddens v. McGinnis, 972 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1992) (text avilable in
Westlaw) (no evidence of exposure); Bullock v. O'Leary, No. 88 C 10148, 1991 WL
206058, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1991) (same); Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp.
58, 60 (D.P.R. 1991) (denying damages for fear of AIDS in plaintiff's claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress when plaintiff could not demonstrate that defendant was
negligent); Hosford v. Estate of Campbell, 708 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1989) (plaintiff's
claim for fear-of-AIDS damages was barred by Dead Man's Statute); Poole v. Alpha
Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff could not recover
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Courts have carefully adhered to the injury requirement 24 6 and, more
importantly, many courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate evi-
dence of actual exposure to HIV.247 Strict adherence to the exposure
requirement is logical because it is unreasonable for a plaintiff to fear a
virus if the plaintiff was not exposed to the virus. Further, because the
plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to substantiate his claim,
it is reasonable to require the plaintiff to present some evidence of actual
exposure to HIV in order to pursue a cause of action for fear of develop-
ing AIDS. 248 A plaintiff who has failed to produce evidence of exposure
to HIV has not met his burden of producing evidence to show that the
defendant proximately caused the plaintiff to fear developing AIDS.249
Courts have allowed plaintiffs to pursue fear-of-AIDS cases where the
facts clearly fall within a recognized cause of action for emotional dis-
tress damages. For example, in Whelan v. Whelan,25° the court denied
the defendant's motion to strike a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In that case, the defendant allegedly falsely informed his
wife that he had AIDS.25 Because a deliberate lie that is totally out of
the bounds of acceptable social behavior can be the basis of a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress,252 the Whelan court correctly
allowed the plaintiff to pursue her claim for damages for fear of AIDS
even though she tested HIV negative.
Similarly, the facts in Cotita v. Pharma-Plast, USA., Inc. 253 contain
all of the elements of a successful fear-of-AIDS claim. In this case, a
nurse was stuck with a needle that was still in its package and lacked its
for fear of AIDS when she failed to show any physical injury); Transamerica Ins. Co. v.
Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 290-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (no recovery from insurer because fear
of AIDS was not covered by terms of policy absent some physical injury); R.E.G. v.
L.M.G. (In re the Marriage of R.E.G.), 571 N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting
that ex-wife's claim of "AIDS-phobia" was based entirely on "conjecture or speculation"
when she tested HIV negative and her ex-husband had repeatedly tested HIV negative);
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598-99 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (plaintiff did not show that her
claim was reasonable because she sustained no physical harm, and she produced no medi-
cal evidence to support her claim).
246. See, Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598-99 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
247. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (requir-
ing plaintiff to show evidence of actual exposure to HIV); Hare v. State, 173 A.D.2d 523,
524-25 (App. Div. 1991) (same); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (same); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991) (same).
248. See, e.g., Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text avail-
able in Westlaw, at * 1) ("The burden on the person claiming damages is to convince the
jury, by the greater weight of the credible evidence to a reasonable certainty, that he has
sustained or will sustain the mental distress and physical harm claimed as a result of the
tortfeasor's negligent conduct.").
249. See supra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
250. 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
251. See id. at 252.
252. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 60.
253. 974 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1992).
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protective tip.2" 4 The nurse feared that he would develop AIDS because
he was wearing plastic gloves that were splattered with HIV-infected
blood when his hand was stuck with the needle." Thus he sustained a
physical injury-a needle wound. Further, because his glove was splat-
tered with infected blood, he was exposed to the risk of infection.
A. Recovery Without Presenting Any Evidence of Exposure
In contrast, some courts have inappropriately extended the scope of
liability by allowing plaintiffs to proceed with claims for damages for fear
of AIDS. This is particularly true in cases in which courts have failed to
enforce the exposure requirement rigorously. In Carroll v. Sisters of
Saint Francis Health Services, Ina,256 one of the most extreme examples,
a Tennessee Appeals Court rejected the actual exposure requirement al-
together." 7 The court held that a plaintiff could pursue a cause of action
for fear of AIDS without presenting any evidence of actual exposure to
HIV.258 The court stated that exposure was simply a factor to consider
in assessing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear." 9
Admittedly, the Carroll court's approach has at least two advantages.
First, by emphasizing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear as the only
relevant consideration, this approach focuses directly on the proximate
cause issue. In assessing whether the hospital is liable for the plaintiff's
emotional distress, the central issue is whether her fear is reasonable.
Second, the Carroll approach may be more fair to plaintiffs who have
been exposed to HIV but, through no fault of their own, are unable to
produce any evidence of exposure. For example, if a person is stuck by a
contaminated needle and the needle is subsequently lost, the Carroll
court would allow that person to bring a claim for fear of AIDS.2" In
contrast, courts applying the strict actual exposure requirement would
bar recovery even if the plaintiff were not responsible for losing the nee-
dle.261 The actual exposure requirement may be unfair because a person
who is stuck with a contaminated needle may not immediately be con-
cerned with preserving evidence for a tort claim.
There are several problems, however, with the Carroll court's ap-
proach. First, allowing plaintiffs to pursue causes of action without
showing any evidence of actual exposure is contrary to the general policy
of limiting emotional distress damages. Courts have limited mental dam-
254. See id
255. See id
256. No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
257. See id. at *4.
258. See id
259. See id
260. Cf Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
261. Cf. Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va.
1991) (requiring plaintiff to produce evidence of actual exposure).
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ages in order to prevent false claims, 262 but, under the Carroll approach,
it will be substantially easier for a plaintiff to recover for a bogus fear of
AIDS because he does not have to present any evidence of exposure.263
Similarly, emotional distress may be remote from the defendant's tor-
tious conduct, and thus the defendant may not have proximately caused
the plaintiff's fear. 26 By rejecting the exposure requirement, the Carroll
court greatly extends the scope of the defendant's liability.
Additionally, relieving the plaintiff of the obligation to present any evi-
dence of actual exposure is contrary to the requirement that plaintiffs
establish each element of a cause of action by a preponderance of the
evidence. A plaintiff must show that the defendant proximately caused
the plaintiff's fear, and this depends on whether the plaintiff's fear is
reasonable.265 In turn, whether a plaintiff's fear is reasonable depends on
whether he was actually exposed to HIV.2 66 A plaintiff who presents
absolutely no evidence of actual exposure to HIV, therefore, has failed to
meet his burden of production.267
Further, the Carroll court disregards the long-standing goal of guard-
ing against a deluge of emotional distress claims.26 8 If plaintiffs can
claim damages for fear of AIDS without producing any evidence of ac-
tual exposure, there will be an incentive to claim fear of AIDS in any
circumstance in which a plaintiff might have been exposed to the virus.
2 69
Because physical injury occurs in most tort cases, a multitude of people
262. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361.
263. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599-600 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (In a case in
which plaintiff produced no evidence of exposure, the court stated: "This court will not,
based on the highly attenuated and speculative allegations contained in the complaint
before it, go far beyond the dictates of this state's highest court and thereby open the
floodgates of psychological injury or 'phobia' cases.").
264. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361.
265. See, e.g., Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Wis. 1974)
(Hansen, J., concurring) ("[A] present fear as to a future harm is not a compensable
element of damages if there is no reasonable basis established for the fear being enter-
tamined and no increased possibility of the consequence feared developing as a result of the
injury sustained.").
266. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("The
court is more concerned with defendant's second ground for challenging plaintiff's com-
plaint; namely, that plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was actually exposed to the
AIDS virus because he cannot prove that the needle with which he was stuck was a
needle that was used on an AIDS patient."); Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield
Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 84 (W. Va. 1991) ("[W]e conclude that if a suit for
damages is based solely upon the plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS, but there is no
evidence of an actual exposure to the virus, the fear is unreasonable, and this Court will
not recognize a legally compensable injury.").
267. See, e.g., Bullock v. O'Leary, No. 88 C 10148, 1991 WL 206058, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 30, 1991) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff presented no evidence of
exposure to HIV); Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D Pa. 1990) (same);
Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (same); Funeral
Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991)
(same).
268. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361.
269. This problem was noted by a New York court when it dismissed a cause of action
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could bring viable claims for fear of AIDS. Every person who receives
blood might be exposed to HIV; every person who is exposed to another
person's bodily fluids might contract HIV; every person who suffers a cut
or scratch might contract the virus. Based on the Carroll court's reason-
ing, in each of these circumstances, a plaintiff could claim damages for
fear of AIDS, and a jury would have to decide whether the plaintiff's fear
is reasonable.270 Also, Carroll is contrary to the weight of authority be-
cause most courts that have considered fear-of-AIDS cases require a
plaintiff to present some evidence of actual exposure.2 '
The Carroll court's decision may also be flawed because it relied heav-
fly upon a Tennessee Supreme Court case that the court may have mis-
read.272 In that case, Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,2" a
family whose well became contaminated with chlordane (a carcinogen)
recovered damages for their fear of developing cancer in the future.27 4 In
Laxton, however, the plaintiffs presented evidence that they had been
actually exposed to the toxic chemical because they testified that they
drank the contaminated water.275 Thus the Laxton court was examining
whether plaintiffs who presented proof of actual exposure had a reason-
able fear.276 Carroll is distinguishable because it presents the additional
question of whether the plaintiff had been exposed to HIV at all.2" The
Carroll court broadly expanded the Laxton holding when it concluded
that a plaintiff who cannot demonstrate any evidence of actual exposure
could reasonably fear AIDS.278
The Carroll court is not alone in allowing plaintiffs who have
alleging emotional distress damages for fear of AIDS because the plaintiff could present
no evidence of exposure. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599-600 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
270. See Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 l0-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *4-5 (Tenn. CL App. Oct. 12, 1992).
271. See Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (plaintiff
could not show exposure to the AIDS virus); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App.
Div. 1991) (no recovery for fear of AIDS when plaintiff was unable to show exposure to
the virus); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (plain-
tiff could not show exposure to HIV and plaintiff tested HIV negative); Funeral Servs. by
Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 82-84 (W. Va. 1991) (no
recovery for fear of AIDS when plaintiff could not show exposure).
272. See Carroll, 1992 WL 276717 at *4 (citing Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
Inc., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982)).
273. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
274. See id.
275. See id. at 432-33.
276. See id. at 434 ("Here it is undisputed that the plaintiffs ingested polluted water
when the defendants negligently permitted dangerous chemicals to infiltrate plaintiffs'
household water supply.").
277. See Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 l0-CV-
00232, 1992 WL 276717, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) (the court stated that the
issue was "whether plaintiff can recover for emotional distress caused by fear of con-
tracting AIDS without proof that plaintiff was exposed to the AIDS virus").
278. See id. at *6 (Higher, J. dissenting) ("Proof of such actual exposure to a harmful
substance is the critical element missing from the present case."). See also John P.
Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages for Fear of
AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 185, 200 (1988) (drawing an anal-
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presented no evidence of HIV exposure to proceed with actions for fear
of AIDS. In Steinhagen v. United States,279 a federal district court al-
lowed a plaintiff to recover damages for fear of AIDS in a malpractice
action.280 The plaintiff feared that she had contracted HIV because she
had received a blood transfusion during surgery. 28' Not only did the
court fail to indicate whether the plaintiff presented any evidence of ac-
tual exposure to HIV, but the decision also does not mention whether the
blood that the patient received was screened for the virus. This case
seems to indicate that merely receiving blood in a hospital may lead to a
reasonable fear of AIDS that can give rise to a claim for emotional dis-
tress damages. Thus, Steinhagen appears to open the floodgates for a
deluge of similar claims.
A closer review of Steinhagen indicates that it may not open the flood-
gates all that far. The plaintiff in Steinhagen suffered very severe physi-
cal injuries and emotional trauma due to the doctor's malpractice.282
Significantly, the court did not separate the plaintiff's recovery for emo-
tional distress damages, but merely noted that the plaintiff was being
compensated for "severe physical, psychological and economic dam-
age." '283 Thus it is unclear whether the plaintiff recovered for her fear of
AIDS or for the emotional distress resulting from her severe trauma
generally.
Failure to present any evidence of exposure is one of two problems in
Kaehne v. Schmidt.284 In this case, the plaintiff sustained injuries in a car
accident and was given blood that was not screened for HIV.285
Although the plaintiff presented no evidence of actual exposure to HIV, a
Wisconsin appeals court upheld his recovery of damages for fear of
AIDS.286 Allowing the plaintiff to recover without demonstrating any
evidence of exposure creates problems similar to those discussed in the
analysis of Carroll.2" 7
Additionally, the Kaehne court seemed to create and apply a bright-
line rule for limiting liability. The court upheld the plaintiff's recovery
for his fear of AIDS until he received a test indicating that he was HIV
negative.2 8 Thus the court apparently created a rule that fear of AIDS
ogy between Laxton and fear-of-AIDS cases with HIV-negative plaintiffs and noting that
a plaintiff would need to be exposed to HIV in order to recover).
279. 768 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
280. See id. at 208.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 203-08.
283. Id. at 208.
284. 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in Westlaw).
285. See id. at *2.
286. See id..
287. See supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
288. Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in
Westlaw, at *2) ("Based on this risk and Kaehne's testimony, the jury could also find that




becomes unreasonable when a plaintiff receives a negative test result.
The Kaehne court failed to note, however, that the plaintiff had a duty
to mitigate the damages suffered in the accident. The plaintiff recovered
damages for the two years of fear he suffered before he took an AIDS test
and tested negative.28 9 Yet, AIDS tests can be administered accurately
three months following exposure to the virus.219 Thus the court could
have limited recovery to damages for the three months before testing be-
came possible. 291 Based on the incomplete reasoning in this case, the
plaintiff could have increased his damages by abstaining from taking an
AIDS test for an even longer period. If, as the Kaehne court indicated,
an HIV-negative test result terminates the defendant's liability for dam-
ages for the plaintiff's fear of future illness,2 92 then it is reasonable to
impose a duty on plaintiffs to be tested.2 9a Although there are arguments
that a plaintiff should recover even after testing negative for the virus,"9
the court did not address these arguments.
B. Recovery After Plaintiff Tests Negative
In assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear, several courts have
noted that the plaintiff tested HIV negative.295 Because AIDS tests accu-
rately indicate whether a plaintiff is infected, courts have focused on neg-
ative test results in determining whether a plantiff's fear is reasonable
and, in turn, whether a defendant is liable for the plaintiff's fear.29 6 This
focus is consistent with courts' examination of the overall reasonableness
289. See id.
290. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
291. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 & n.10 (Md. 1993) (plaintiff can only
recover damages for fear of AIDS for period of time before testing becomes viable).
292. See Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in
Westlaw, at *2).
293. It is reasonable to require plaintiffs to undergo an AIDS test because the tests are
readily available and inexpensive or free. The Centers for Disease Control note that the
number of HIV testing sites increased from 1,577 in January 1988 to 5,013 in September
1989. See Publicly Funded HIV Counseling and Testing-United States, 1985-1989, 39
Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 137 (March 9, 1990). Further, an estimated 2.5 mil-
lion people were tested for AIDS at publicly funded facilities between 1985 and 1990. Id.
294. See infra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
295. See Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D.P.R. 1991) (The court
denied recovery, noting that: "Plaintiffhas repeatedly tested negative for the AIDS virus,
but plaintiff alleges that current medical technology does not rule out the possibility that
she is in fact infected, so her fear continues."); Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp.
285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) ("It is extremely unlikely that a patient who tests HIV-negative
more than six months after a potential exposure will contract the disease as a result of
that exposure."); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991) ("mT1he claimant
himself was tested for AIDS several times with negative results.").
296. See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288; Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 & n.10 (Md.
1993) (plaintiffs can only recover damages for fear of AIDS during "their reasonable
window of anxiety-the period between which they learned [about their exposure to the
virus] and received their HIV-negative results"). But see Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Fran-
cis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-901 I-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at 04 (Tenn. App.
Ct. Oct. 12, 1992) ("AIDS testing is not susceptible of the same degree of certitude as is
testing for other pathogens for a number of reasons.").
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of plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress in other cases. 297 Plaintiffs can
only recover emotional distress damages for reasonable fear.29
Even in cases in which a plaintiff may have originally developed a rea-
sonable fear of AIDS, some courts have failed to examine the overall
reasonableness of a plaintiff's claim after the plaintiff tests HIV negative.
When properly administered, current AIDS tests are more than 99% re-
liable.299 In examining whether a plaintiff's fear of AIDS remains rea-
sonable after testing has become viable, courts should take the accuracy
of these tests into account.
Some courts have given insufficient weight to the fact that a plaintiff
has tested HIV negative. For example, in Johnson v. West Virginia Uni-
versity Hospitals, Inc., a police officer recovered $1.9 million for his
fear of AIDS, and the Supreme Court of West Virginia held that his fear
was reasonable, 30 1 even though he repeatedly tested HIV negative for
three years following exposure. 30 2 Although the court's opinion is some-
what vague, the plaintiff apparently recovered for past, present, and fu-
ture fear that he might some day develop AIDS.303 Similarly, in
Christian v. Sheft,304 Rock Hudson's former lover recovered from Mr.
Hudson's estate for his fear of developing AIDS, despite the fact that the
plaintiff had tested negative and, years after Mr. Hudson's death, had no
AIDS symptoms. 305
There are a number of reasons why these courts should have empha-
sized negative-HIV test results when they assessed the reasonableness of
the plaintiffs' claims. First, although AIDS tests are not 100% reliable,
they offer a solid statistical probability of infection that is very useful in
determining whether a plaintiff's fear is reasonable. Because AIDS tests
can be more than 99% accurate, 306 the fact that a plaintiff tests HIV
negative (after testing becomes viable) indicates a strong probability that
the plaintiff is not infected. As a result, emphasizing negative test results
would be consistent with past emotional distress policies that have
sought to limit the defendant's liability by not awarding damages that
297. See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
298. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (plaintiffs can only recover
damages for fear of AIDS during "their reasonable window of anxiety"); Howard v.
Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Wis. 1974) (Hansen, J. concurring)
(plaintiff cannot recover for unreasonable fear).
299. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
300. 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
301. See id. at 894.
302. See id. at 891.
303. See id. at 891-92 (awarding emotional distress damages for past and present fam-
ily turmoil, current sleeplessness and fact that plaintiff "is very uncertain about his
future").
304. See AIDS, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 53 (discussing Christian v. Sheft, C574 153
(Cal. Super. Ct.)).
305. See id.
306. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
FEAR OF AIDS
were too remote from the tortious conduct."0 7 In Christian and Johnson,
the plaintiffs repeatedly tested HIV negative and, thus, there is a tenuous
link between the plaintiffs' continued mental suffering and the defend-
ants' conduct.
Second, a greater emphasis on the reasonableness element limits a de-
fendant's liability by not awarding compensation for future injuries that
are very improbable and thus are not proximate.308 Such a policy would
also discourage frivolous or baseless claims for fear of AIDS. °
Third, courts should not encourage the public to fear AIDS and doubt
established medical procedures. In Johnson, by upholding an award for
fear of AIDS to a man who has repeatedly tested negative over the
course of three years, the highest court in West Virginia sent a clear
message to the public that it considers it reasonable for a person to con-
tinue to fear AIDS even though the medical community believes that he
is not infected.310 Further, the court attributed a portion of Johnson's
damages to the fact that his family, fearing that he might infect them,
abandoned him.311 The family's fears in this case, however, were baseless
because there is substantial medical evidence that people cannot transmit
HIV via the daily contact involved in living with an infected person. 312
Again, public policy requires that the Johnson family's unreasonable
fears should not be considered a proximate result of the hospital's tor-
tious conduct.
Although courts may question the reliability of AIDS tests because of
the possibility of human error or because of the possibility of infection
with a new strain of the virus, there is still good reason for courts to
accept these tests as accurate. Human error is a real possibility in AIDS
testing, but in cases in which HIV-negative plaintiffs have recovered for
fear of AIDS, they have taken several AIDS tests and each test has come
back negative.313 This multiple testing substantially reduces the element
of human error. Similarly, the fact that standard AIDS tests are not
reliable predictors of HIV-2 infection 3 4 has little bearing on the reasona-
307. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 360-61; see also Howard v. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc.,
217 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Wis. 1974).
308. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 361; Howard 217 N.W.2d at 385.
309. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 360.
310. See Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (%V. Va. 1991).
311. See id at 891 n.2, 891-92 (The plaintiff's wife divorced him and the plaintiff's
"children did not want to be around him, nor did they want their children... around
him, due to a fear that they may contract AIDS.").
312. See Gerald Friedland et al., Additional Evidencefor Lack of Transmission of HIV
Infection by Close Interpersonal (Casual) Contact, 4 AIDS 639, 639 (1990); Martha F.
Rogers et al., Lack of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus from Infected
Children to Their Household Contacts, 85 Pediatrics 210, 210 (1990).
313. See eg., Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 891 ("Although the appellee is regularly tested
for AIDS, he has not contracted the disease."); see also Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis
Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 WL 276717, at 02 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Oct. 12, 1992) ("The record also establishes that HIV tests were performed on several
occasions... and were all negative.").
314. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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bleness of the plaintiff's fear. HIV-2 is extremely rare in the United
States, and thus there is little probability of infection.315 Also, a plaintiff
who claims to fear HIV-2 infection can take a test for this strain of the
virus, and this test is over 99% reliable.31 6
Admittedly, several strong counter-arguments suggest that an HIV-
negative test result does not render a plaintiff's fear unreasonable. First,
the tests may be less than 99% reliable in sub-optimal conditions.31 7 Sec-
ond, there may be at least one new strain of the virus that cannot be
detected using current procedures.318 Third, even if the tests were 99%
accurate, a 1% chance of developing AIDS may be sufficient to establish
that the plaintiff's fear was proximately caused. Courts have used vari-
ous standards in assessing whether emotional damages were proximately
caused.319 Some of these standards are so permissive that they allow re-
covery even when there is no chance of the feared contingency actually
occurring;32° other courts have allowed recovery when there is a chance
that the contingency "might" occur,32 1 or even when the possibility that
it might occur "could not be ruled out. ' 322 Fourth, given the severe na-
ture of this disease, even a remote chance of infection may be the basis of
a reasonable fear. AIDS is a long-term degenerative disease that leads to
a slow, painful death, and AIDS victims have faced discrimination and
social ostracism. Thus, even a slim probability of infection may be suffi-
cient to substantiate a reasonable fear.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This Note proposes two alternative methods for determining whether
HIV-negative plaintiffs should recover damages for fear of AIDS.323 The
first simply adopts a stringent step-by-step application of traditional tort
principles governing recovery for emotional distress. The second ap-
proach is based on an increased emphasis on overall reasonableness.
Under this approach, HIV-negative plaintiffs would be precluded from
recovering for their fear of AIDS after testing becomes viable.
A. Traditional Common Law Approach
An HIV-negative plaintiff seeking to recover for fear of AIDS under a
negligence theory must satisfy several requirements. First, the plaintiff
must satisfy the common law rule applied in the jurisdiction by demon-
315. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
319. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
320. See supra note 192.
321. See Baylor v. Tyrrell, 131 N.W.2d 393, 402 (Neb. 1964).
322. Figlar v. Gordon, 53 A.2d 645, 648 (Conn. 1947).
323. This Note does not propose any new method for analyzing claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress in cases similar to Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1991). See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
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strating either an injury or a physical impact. 324 These common law
rules limit the scope of the duty of care and insure that courts will not
hold a defendant liable for damages that are remote from the wrongful
conduct. 325 Almost all legitimate claims for emotional damages for fear
of AIDS will include some injury, because transmitting HIV requires a
mixing of bodily fluid such as blood.
Additionally, in negligence or battery actions, courts should require
plaintiffs to provide some evidence of actual exposure to HIV.326 Expo-
sure is critical in the proximate cause analysis because whether the de-
fendant proximately caused the plaintiff's emotional distress depends on
whether the plaintiff's fear is reasonable.327 It is unreasonable for a per-
son to fear infection when that person has not been exposed to a disease.
Because plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the proximate cause of
their injuries, they must provide some proof of actual exposure to HIV to
demonstrate that their fear is reasonable.328 When a plaintiff fails to pro-
duce any evidence of actual exposure, the plaintiff has failed to meet the
burden of production on the issue of proximate cause and the court
should grant summary judgment for the defendant. 32 9
Under this analysis, actual exposure is an essential element of a cause
of action for fear-of-AIDS damages. 330 Given the extensive discovery
possible in civil suits, requiring plaintiffs to provide some evidence of ex-
posure is not an onerous burden. Allowing juries to decide whether the
plaintiff's fear is reasonable even where there is no evidence of exposure
invites jury speculation and may allow recovery based on ignorance or
unreasonable fear of this disease.
Finally, courts should continue to examine the overall reasonableness
of the plaintiff's fear. Courts should not determine the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's fear solely by an application of the injury, impact, or expo-
sure requirements. Rather, courts should exercise their discretion and
examine the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's alleged fear, includ-
ing the plaintiff's HIV-negative test result. To this end, courts should
324. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 54-55.
326. See supra notes 108-53 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 111-45 and accompanying text.
329. See, eg., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (dis-
missing plaintiff's products liability claim for damages for fear of AIDS on summary
judgment because plaintiff could not show actual exposure to HIV and because it was
substantially certain that the plaintiff was not infected); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment because plaintiff could not demonstrate exposure and because the plaintiff had
tested HIV negative).
330. Compare Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1991) (allowing recovery when HIV-negative plaintiff produced evidence of exposure to
the virus) with Funeral Servs. by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (denying recovery when HIV-negative plaintiff did not present
evidence of exposure to the virus).
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require plaintiffs to submit to AIDS tests as soon as, according'to current
medical knowledge, testing becomes viable.331 Not only will this help a
court to assess the overall reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear, but requir-
ing a plaintiff to take an AIDS test may mitigate the defendant's
damages.
Under this first approach, plaintiffs who demonstrate actual exposure
to HIV could recover emotional distress damages for fear of AIDS for
the period of time before testing becomes viable. This period is usually
about three months following initial exposure.3 32 Once testing has be-
come viable, a plaintiff could recover only for continued fear if the cir-
cumstances indicate that the fear is reasonable.
B. Limiting Recovery After a Plaintiff Tests HIV Negative
In the alternative, the second method incorporates all the elements of
the first approach in determining whether a plaintiff's fear is reasonable
during the period when testing for AIDS is not viable,333 but cuts off a
plaintiff's ability to recover once the plaintiff receives a negative test re-
sult.334 Under this approach, the plaintiff would be required to submit to
an AIDS test as soon as accurate detection seemed likely; currently this
is about three months following exposure to the virus. 335 If the plaintiff
claims damages for fear of HIV-2, then he would be required to take an
HIV-2 test. Cutting off liability after the plaintiff receives a negative test
result would be based on a judicial determination that the plaintiff's con-
tinuing fear is per se unreasonable.
Although this approach creates a bright-line rule that courts have
331. A counter-argument can be made that AIDS testing is intrusive and painful, and
therefore the plaintiff should not be required to submit to such tests. Additionally, the
issue arises as to who should pay for the test. This appears to be a less significant matter,
however, because thousands of publicly-funded clinics nationwide test for AIDS.
Even taking these counter-arguments into consideration, however, it appears that
plaintiffs should still be required to submit to testing. Courts require medical examina-
tions of plaintiffs in other tort actions and there is no reason why a court should not
require a plaintiff to take a quick, inexpensive (or free), and pertinent test that could
reduce damages and greatly aid in assessing the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear.
332. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
333. Plaintiffs would still be required to fulfill the necessary impact or injury require-
ment and would have to present some evidence of actual exposure to HIV.
334. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 337 (Md. 1993) (HIV-negative plaintiffs can
only recover damages for fear of AIDS for period of time before they test HIV negative);
see also Kaehne v. Schmidt, 472 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (text available in
Westlaw, at *2) (plaintiff recovered damages for fear of AIDS for period of time until he
tested HIV negative).
335. Interpretation and Use of the Western Blot Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human In-
munodeficiency Virus Type 1 Infections, 38 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 1, 5 (July
21, 1989) ("[S]eroconversion typically occurs within 3 months of infection."); Public
Health Service Guidelines for Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection
and AIDS, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep., 509, 509 (Aug. 14, 1987) ("Persons
exposed to HIV usually develop detectable levels of antibody against the virus within 6-
12 weeks of infection.").
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rarely applied in fear-of-disease cases, 3 6 there are several reasons for im-
posing it in fear-of-AIDS cases. First, this solution is consistent with
traditional tort notions regarding emotional distress because it continues
the policy of limiting recovery to only those injuries that the defendant's
tortious conduct proximately caused. Second, this approach creates no
new rule of law but simply employs existing rules and requirements with
a vigor consistent with historical emotional distress policies.337 Courts
have always assessed emotional distress claims based on their overall rea-
sonableness. 338 Thus, courts would continue to do so and would simply
be determining that, in this one type of fear-of-disease case, an extremely
low probability of infection renders a plaintiff's fear per se unreasonable.
Third, it may be equitable to cut off the plaintiff's recovery after the
three month window has closed. It is possible that a plaintiff could test
HIV positive after a court has rejected his claim for fear of AIDS. Yet,
such a plaintiff might be able to bring a second cause of action to recover
damages for prospective illness.339 Finally, if a person who fears HIV
after testing negative is not infected, the person has recovered damages
for the three months immediately following exposure when the fear was
reasonable. But the court would deny further recovery after the plaintiff
tests HIV negative.
CONCLUSION
In deciding fear-of-AIDS cases, many courts have vigorously enforced
rules established to limit the scope of a defendant's liability. They have
dismissed claims where plaintiffs have not suffered any physical injury.
Further, they have required plaintiffs to produce evidence of actual expo-
sure to HIV as a prerequisite to recovery. Other courts, however, have
allowed HIV-negative plaintiffs to pursue causes of action alleging fear of
AIDS, without requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate evidence of actual
exposure to HIV or without giving sufficient weight to the fact that a
negative test result is strong evidence that the plaintiff is not infected.
These courts should reconsider their approach and require HIV-negative
plaintiffs to present evidence of actual exposure. Further, they should
closely examine the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear in light of the fact
that a very reliable test indicates that the plaintiff is not infected.
336. But see supra note 334.
337. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
339. This raises procedural questions that are outside the scope of this Note. On one
hand, the plaintiff who loses an action for fear of future illness might be precluded from
bringing an action for prospective illness based on the theory that plaintiffs cannot split
claims. On the other hand, an HIV negative plaintiff could argue that the injuries were
undiscoverable at the time and therefore the claim should not be barred. Further, a
plaintiff's later claim for prospective illness might be barred for violating the applicable
Statute of Limitations. Yet, the plaintiff could argue that the injury was not previously
discoverable and the statute should be tolled.
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